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COMMENTARY
Korean Hostile Takeovers And The
Friendly Internationalization of the
Securities Market: An Investor Protection
Perspective
Kwang-Rok Kim*
During the 1980s and 1990s, the trend towards
internationalization transformed capital markets globally.
Recently, the internationalization of world securities markets
created a blast of corporate hunting in the Korean securities
market. In the new economy, tender offers have become the
most significant tactical development in the international
corporate takeover arena.' To fully understand the extent of
change, we must first remember the history of tender offers in
Korea.
Korea established its first tender offer system in 1976.
During the next twenty years no tender offer transactions
occurred. Then, on October 26, 1994, Hansol Paper
Manufacturing Company made a hostile tender offer to Donghae
Banking Corporation. This was recorded as the first successful
hostile tender offer in Korea. Since then, tender offers have
often been used as the method to acquire control of corporations.
Recently, Korea amended its tender offer regulations regarding
corporate purchase provisions were amended so that tender
offers will be more popular than ever.

* Visiting Scholar, Indiana University; Post-Doctorate Researcher, BK Law 21, Seoul
National University, Seoul, Korea; J.S.D. 2001, Washington University; LL.M. 1999,
Indiana University; Master of Law 1993, Soong Sil University, Seoul, Korea; LL.B.
1991, Soong Sil University, Seoul, Korea.
1. See Christopher B. Bernard, Towards an InternationalMarket in Mutual
Funds, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 467 (1996); See Joseph B. Cahill, Circuits Spilt on the
Elements of William Act "Manipulation" - Validity of Tender Offer Defenses
Uncertain, 60 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 935 (1984).
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In the beginning of 1998, the Korean government amended
the foreign stock exchange regulations and released a new policy
for free foreign exchange and foreign investment. Moreover, the
tender market has increased due to the amendments in the
Korean Securities and Exchange Act (KSEA). The Korean
government relaxed its limitations on foreign ownership of
equity, abolished the limitation on foreign subscription for the
public purchase of shares, eliminated the twenty-five mandatory
tender offer system, 2 and granted full permission to foreign
investors' hostile takeover activities in the secondary market.
Notably, the government quickly created these vehicles for
foreign investment in Korean securities market, only a short
time right after the economic crisis in late 1997. These
amendments were completed without sufficient scholarly
research about securities regulation, and do not reflect the
special situation and securities practices of Korean enterprises.
The rushed adoption in 1997 now requires that these
amendments be carefully reconsidered to ensure that the
Korean tender offer regulations to keep up with the securities
regulations' ultimate purpose "to contribute to the development
of the national economy by protecting investors through fair
issuance, purchase, sale or other transactions of securities." 3
Additionally, the law should allow Korea to catch up with the
world securities market's fair internationalization. For this
purpose, this Article analyzes the KSEA tender offer
regulations. In addition, this Article assesses problematic issues
arising from the tender offer and makes suggestions for
improving Korean tender offer regulation in the securities
practice.
I.

THE HOSTILE TENDER OFFER UNDER KOREAN LAW

Under the KSEA, the tender offer is described as an offer to
buy stock, or a solicitation of an offer to sell stocks against
"many and unspecified persons," and as buying stocks "outside
2. Under the twenty-five percent mandatory tender offer system, shareholders
wishing to hold twenty-five percent or more of outstanding voting shares were
obligated to acquire them through tender offer. In addition, the number of shares for

tender offer needed to be more than fifty percent of outstanding voting shares
including their securities. This twenty-five percent mandatory tender offer system
was abolished on Feb. 24, 1998. See WOON-YOUL CHOI & YEONG-HO Woo,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE: RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA 5

(1998).
3. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 1.
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the securities market" or the intermediation market operated by
the Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA).4 In addition,
the tender offer is mandatory when a person intends to acquire
five percent or more of voting stock or any other securities
through purchase, exchange, bid or any other acquisition by
transfer from more than ten shareholders in six months.5 This
section of the article explains the Korean regulations governing
these transactions, noting places reform or revision in Korean
law is needed.
The scope of tender offer regulation is limited. First, the
tender offer in Korea applies only to transactions "outside the
securities market," securities transactions at the Korea Stock
Exchange (KSE), which is the only stock exchange in Korea, or
at the intermediate market operated by the KSDA, cannot be
recognized as tender offers. The reason why the tender offer is
restricted to transactions "outside the securities market" is
because transactions "outside the securities market" carry more
risk than those on the KSE, which is secured by the nature of
disclosure, equitability, and transferability, through selfregulation and other rules. Thus, the tender offer regulations of
the KSEA need not apply to securities transactions at the KSE
because its own laws and regulations already protect
participating investors.
Second, the counterparts of the tender offeror must be
"many and unspecified persons." In other words, a solicitation of
an offer to sell stocks does not apply to a limited number of
people. It is very hard to define a tangible numerical criterion
for "many and unspecified persons" however, when the tender
offer applies to a group of people including many qualified
shareholders who have sufficient knowledge and experience
about a securities investment. In particular, when an offeror
buys stocks several times from specific persons up to five
percent, or from "many but specified persons," the tender offer
cannot be forced because the offeror did not buy from
"unspecified persons."
Therefore, the tender offer can be forced in limited
circumstances. According to the KSEA, only when a person
intends to acquire five percent or more of voting stocks, or any
other securities through purchase outside the securities
markets, by transfer from more than ten shareholders in six
4. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21(3).
5. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21(1); Enforcement Decree of
the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 10-2.
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months, 6 can the tender offer be forced. As seen above, the
KSEA tries concretely to prescribe the meaning of the tender
offer. In another words, it seems that the KSEA limits the scope
of the tender offer is, and then ensures the legal stability of
securities transactions by preventing the disputes over the
formation of the tender offer. However, since the tender offer in
Korea applies only when a person intends to acquire five percent
or more of voting stocks, through purchase outside the securities
markets by transferring from more than ten shareholders in six
moths, 7 the securities transaction at the KSE cannot be
recognized as a tender offer. Notably, a different result might
occur under the SEC's eight-factor test.8
Application of the tender offer provision requires companies
to determine how many people participated in the transfer. In
addition, the numerical referent in the "many and unspecified
persons" clause should be estimated by considering the
conditions of each transaction rather than using a definite
numerical standard. Consequently, the meaning of tender offer
should be estimated by considering the conditions of each
transaction rather than prescribing the definite standard. 9 To
address the lack of clarity in this area, Korean regulators should
standardize legal treatment of the numerical criterion.
Generally, the tender offer is mandatory under the
applicable conditions and the tender offer procedure. However,
since KSEA Article 21(1) describes the scope of tender offer
application in details, the tender offer must meet some
conditions in order to be legally effective in the securities
market. In order to complete a tender offer, the tender offeror
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. In the United States, the meaning of a tender offer can be defined by the
eight-factors test. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd
on other grounds, 682 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
The Wellman court suggested the eight elements of the tender offer as such: (1)
active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer;
(2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (3) offer to
purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price; (4) terms of the offer
are firm rather than negotiable; (5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number
of shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be purchased; (6) offer open
only a limited period of time; (7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock; and
(8) whether the public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the
target company precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of the
target company's securities. See id. at 823-824.
9. Defining the meaning of the tender offer in the United States more likely
depends on each situation. See Hanson Trust PLC. v. SCM Corp, 774 F 2d. 47, 57
(2d Cir. 1985).
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ought to hold the stocks through purchase from not less than
ten persons outside the securities market during the six months
prior to the date on which the purchase of the stocks is
conducted. In addition, the tender offer should involve five
percent or more of the total number of the company's stocks.
The tender offeror includes not only the purchaser himself
(including an individual, a corporation, and any other
organization) but also the "specially connected persons" who are
"specially related persons" and "persons acting in concert." 10
Here, the "persons acting in concert" are those who (1) acquire
or dispose of stocks by agreement or contract with the person
concerned, or (2) who have agreed to exercise voting rights,
including the right to give instructions as to the exercise of
voting rights, together with the person concerned, and the
"specially related person" is someone who possesses the number
of stocks less than 1,000, or (3) he presents evidence that he is
not a person in concert; he shall not be regarded as a specially
related person in the application of the tender offer.'1 Thus, in
order to be a "person acting in concert" under the KSEA, a
person must jointly acquire or dispose of stocks through an
agreement or contract with a tender offeror, or make an
agreement with a tender offeror to exercise the voting right or
12
right in concert.
The notion of "specially related persons" is much broader
than the notion of the "persons acting in concert" under the
KSEA. Therefore, there might be a situation in which a specially
related person, who may not realize he is a specially related
person because the scope of the specially related person is so
broad, violates the tender offer regulation without his notice. In
order to make the scope of the tender offer clearer, regulators
should unite the notion of the "specially related person" with the
notion of the "persons acting in concert."
A person who intends to purpose a tender offer should file
the tender offer statement with the Financial Supervisory
Commission (FSC), one of the main government bodies
regulating securities in Korea. The tender offer statement,
which is subject to a form prescribed by the FSC, should contain

10. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21(1); Enforcement Decree of
the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, arts. 10-3, 10-3(2), & 10-3(4).
11. See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, arts.
10-3(3) & 10-3(4).
12. See Jong-Joon Song, The Legal Principalof Compulsory Tender Offer and
Future Legal Problems,76 HANKUK BUBHAK WONBO 11 (1997).
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the purpose of the tender offer, details of funds for purchase,
conditions such as period, price and settlement day of purchase,
and other matters. 13 The tender offer goes into effect ten days
after the date on which the tender offer statement has been
filed. 14 The objective of the ten day waiting period is to allow
sufficient time for investors to avoid making a hasty decision to
sell. However, the ten days waiting period can also cause some
unreasonable results such as dangerous of insider trading.
Therefore, to fulfill the purpose of the tender offer, the waiting
period may not be necessary.
Note that the tender offeror does not have a duty to
purchase all the stocks stated in the tender offer statement
when the tender offeror publicly notifies conditions. In that case,
the conditions should be written in the tender offer statement,
and should be publicly announced at the time of public notice of
commencement of tender offer. 15 What about not purchasing the
securities at all after the public notice of the tender offer? If the
tender offeror has the ability to cancel the tender offer without
any restriction after the disclosure of the tender offer, it may
cause confusion not only to the target company but also to the
securities market. Therefore, basically, a tender offeror may not
withdraw a tender offer after it has been made, while the
tendering stockholder who accepts an offer to buy stocks may
6
cancel such a subscription at any time during the tender offer.
If someone intends to acquire voting stocks through
purchase outside the securities market during the specific
period, he shall acquire the stocks through the method of the
tender offer." Here, the period in which to apply the tender offer
is a six month period from the date on which the purchase of the
stocks is conducted.' 8 The purpose of setting up a six month
period may be to provide transparency for transactions made to
gain a controlling interest, thereby restraining a large volume of
securities transactions traded without sufficient information to
the shareholders. 9 However, in the real world, even though the
shareholders or investors of a target company would like to have
13.
14.
15.
13-2.
16.
17.
18.
10-2(1).
19.

See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21-2(1).
See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, arts. 21-2 & 23(1)
See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, arts. 24-2(1) & 24-2(3).
See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21(1).
See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
See YOUNG-MOO SHIN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT 386 (1989).
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sufficient time to a make decisions on the tender offer, the six
month period is too long to secure the objectives of the tender
offer. Thus, since the six month period of the tender offer is
unreasonable to keep up with the function of a capital market, it
should reasonably be revised, or abolished.
Under the KSEA, the applicable securities of the tender
offer should be the securities issued by a listed corporation.
Alternatively, they should be a corporation registered with the
KSDA, those securities which are related to voting stocks, such
as stock certificates, a certificate representing preemptive
rights, convertible bonds, certificates of bonds with warrants,
bonds belong to the scope of
and certificates of exchangeable
20
applicable securities.
Then, how to calculate the five percent of the possessed
securities? Since the potential securities are included in the
applicable securities of the tender offer in addition to the class of
securities that have voting rights, the way to calculate is very
complicated. Moreover, variety of the applicable securities is
unreasonable not only because of the complicated calculation,
but also because of the fact that convertible bonds and
certificates of bonds with warrants, including preferred stocks,
those which are issued for a corporation's capital increment by a
corporation itself, are included in the applicable securities of the
tender offer. The complicated calculation of the rate can cause
the unexpected exceeding rate of the possessed securities. Thus,
there may be unforeseen burdens placed on the tender offeror
that would impede the free securities transaction. Hence, the
applicable securities of the tender offer in Korea need to be
limited on the securities themselves, which have the voting
rights to secure the free securities transaction in Korea.
As seen the above, if anyone, including a specially
connected person, who possesses five percent of stocks, and
intends to acquire voting stocks through purchase from more
than ten stockholders of the target company outside the
securities market during the six months period, must acquire
the stocks through the method of the tender offer.
Generally, acquisition of five percent of the total issued
shares may not be important information affecting corporate
management. However, since it may seriously affect the market
situation in terms of supply and demand, this information is

20. See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
10. Those stocks will be referred as "potential stocks" throughout this Article.
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considered important market information for investors.
Furthermore, it might threaten the management rights of the
existing management or affect the management rights.
Therefore, companies must disclose such information, and the
tender offer shall be forced when the total number of securities
after the purchase outside the securities market during the
tender offer period is five percent or more of the total number of
the target company's stocks.2 1 Note that the five percent refers
to the percentile of holding stocks that the tender offeror will
possess after the purchase of the stocks, including the already
held securities and newly purchased securities. 22 Also, the
number of ten or more persons is an essential element of the
mandatory tender offer, and the legislators, perhaps, have
judged that there is no need to protect shareholders through the
23
tender offer if the number of persons is less than ten.
Therefore, when someone possesses none of the target
company's stock, did not purchase any of the target company's
stock during the tender offer period, but purchased five percent
of the target company's stocks from the ten shareholders just
before ending the period, the tender offer is mandatory. When
someone possesses no stock of the target company before the
tender offer period, purchases three percent of the target
company's stocks from six shareholders, and then he purchases
an additional five percent of the target company's stocks from
three shareholders just before ending the period, the tender
offer is not mandatory because he did not purchased stocks from
more than ten shareholders of the target company. In addition,
the KSEA provides the notion of the "equivalent-to-ownership"
securities, which do not belong to the tender offeror, but belong
to the notion of the number of five percent. 24 Namely, when the
specially connected persons have the "equivalent to ownership,"
his possessed securities are included in the number of five
percent of the total stocks.
21. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21(1).
22. The Williams Act in the United States also provides the five percent rule,
and the KSEA clarified the meaning of five percent of the Securities Exchange Act
§13(d)(1). See 15 U.S.C. 78m(d)(1) (1988).
23. See KON-SIK KIM, TENDER OFFER SYSTEM UNDER THE REVISED SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE ACT 32 (1997). Also see Jong-Joon Song, supra note 12, at 13.
24. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21(1); Enforcement Decree of
the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 10-4. The meaning of "the equivalent
to ownership" is introduced from the notion of "beneficial ownership" of the United
States securities laws. See Jong-Joon Song, Major Securities Purchase's duty to
Disclose under the United States Securities and Exchange Act, 5 CHOONGBUK UNIV.
L REV, 211 (1993).
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However, since the KSEA added the notion of a "beneficial
ownership" as the "equivalent-to-ownership," to calculate the
number of securities, the notion of ownership is much expanded,
causing complicated calculations of the number of the possessed
securities of the tender offer that will be seen in the next
Section. Thus, the KSEA needs to more clearly regulate the
25
notion of the "equivalent-to-ownership."
II. THE TENDER OFFER DUTIES
In general, the corporate disclosure system forming the core
of the securities market information is a system intended to
accurately provide investors with important corporate
information on the company's past, present and future
management and financial status, including future project plan.
The objective of disclosure is to help investors make rational
investment judgment, ensuring fair practice at the securities
market. To enable investors to make rational investment
judgment, the KSEA and Korean Commercial Act (KCA) ensure
a disclosure system, prescribing a basic corporate disclosure
26
system through the KCA.
In order to protect investors who are faced with a tender
offer, the tender offeror must disclose the complete and just
information on the tender offer for helping investors make their
investment decision. Under the KSEA, the tender offeror must
file a tender offer statement with the FSC.27 The tender offer
statement shall contain accurate and particular information,
such as the purpose of the tender offer, details of funds for
purchase, conditions such as period, price and settlement day of
purchase, and so forth. 28 The KSEA restrictively enumerates
some material information. 29 At the same time, the tender offer
25. The SEC Rule 13d-3, which is as a mother regulation of the "equivalent-toownership" in Korea, shows the determination of the beneficial owner very clearly.
See SEC Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-3(a)-(c).
26. See Korean Commercial Act, arts. 373 (Minutes of general Meeting); 412-2
(Director's Duty to report); 414 (Auditor's Liability); 449 (Approval and Public Notice
of Financial Statements); & 466 (Shareholder's right to inspect Accounting Books).
27. See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
11-4(4).
28. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 21-2(1). For more information
about "other matters" see the Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and
Exchange Act, art. 11-4(3).
29. See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
11-4(2). In addition, for the importance of the information to be disclosed, the KSEA
urges the tender offeror to accompany the additional documents. See Enforcement
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statement shall be submitted to the FSC for an inspection of
possible falseness, and shall be submitted to the target company
for the existing majority stockholders' interest and the interests
of the company itself. All these duties to submit the tender offer
statement are to promote the transparency of the tender offer.
The tender offeror can freely change the conditions of the
tender offer, but the KSEA prohibits modifying conditions,
unfavorable to the tendering stockholders, to protect investors.
The prohibited unfavorable modifications are reduction of
purchase price, and a decrease in the number of stocks, which
are intended to be purchase, extension of payment period,
purchase amount, reduction of the period of the tender offer,
alteration of the type of consideration to be paid to the tendering
stockholder, and other cases prescribed by the FSC as the
modification of tender offer which is unfavorable to the
tendering stockholders. 30 As a result, the KSEA prohibits only
conditions unfavorable to the tendering stockholders. Thus, the
modifications that are favorable to the tendering stockholders,
could be carried out at any time for the investor's benefit.
However, the FSC may issue an order to amend the tender
offer statement when the statement is incomplete in its form or
inadequate in any material information required to be stated
therein. 31 In the case where an order is issued, the tender offer
statement shall not be construed as received by the FSC after
the date on which the order is issued. 32 So, the tender offer will
go into effect when ten days have passed from the date on which
the amendment statement is filed. 33 The amendment statement
order is issued only by the Commission's decision, and the
KSEA does not provide the FSC's responsibility for the abuse of
an order to amend a statement. Thus, a provision related to the
FSC's order to amend a statement should be established by the
KSEA to prevent the FSC's arbitrary abuse of an amendment
order. Especially, the scope of the information, which should be
stated in the tender offer statement, is so numerous and
complicated under the KSEA, that it should be, at least, limited
Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 11-4(3).
30. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 23-2; Enforcement Decree of
the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 12-6.
31. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, arts. 23-2(2); Enforcement Decree
of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 11(1).
32. See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
11(2).
33. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 23(1); Enforcement Decree of
the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 11(5).
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items, and the details should be mandated to the FSC.
The tender offer regulations should guarantee the secure
and fair disclosure of the tender offer information in order to
protect investors' benefits through forcing a tender offeror and a
target company to disclose all the information related to the
tender offer. Especially in case of a hostile tender offer, the
presentation of a target company's opinion, such as approval,
objection, or neutrality, is very important for investors to make
their investment decision. Nevertheless, while the KSEA
34
provides the tender offeror's duty to disclose information, it
does not prescribe the target company's duty to disclose
information, even though the information is material to the
tendering stockholders' investment decision. On the contrary,
the target company has only the right to present its opinion on
the tender offer instead of having a duty to disclose information
related to the tender offer. 35 When the target company exercises
the right to present its opinion, the issuer should file a written
statement describing the contents of such opinion without delay
with the FSC and the KSE or the KSDA, but there is not a
specific scope of the opinion prescribed. 36 Thus, in order to
impose a duty to disclose on a target company, the KCA, as it
relates to the director's liability to the company, can be used to
interpret the target company's duty to disclose information
instead of the KSEA.3 7 Consequently, even though the KSEA
does not require the target company to disclose information, the
target company's board of directors should positively present its
opinion, or disclose the information related to the tender offer in
order to protect its shareholders under the general director's
duty to the company under the KCA. 38 When the target
company presents its opinion, the target company should
immediately submit a written statement describing the opinion
on the tender offer with the FSC and the KSE or the
Association. 39 In this case, the issuer of stocks may present his
opinion by means of advertisement, correspondence or other
document in order to raise the transparency of the tender

34.
11-4(2).
35.
36.
art. 13.
37.
38.
39.

See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 25.
See id.; Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act,
See Korean Commercial Act, arts. 399(1)-(3).
See id.
See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 25.
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offer. 40 In addition, as long as the target company keeps silent
with relation to the undisclosed information, there is no way to
disclose the information. Thus, the target company's right to
present an opinion must be a duty and not a right, contrasts
with the tender offeror's duty to disclose information for the
investor's protection.
III. SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE KOREAN LAWS COMPLY
WITH THE TREND OF INTERNATIONALIZATION
Traditionally, the hostile take over is not reasonably
estimated by a corporate climate and the public opinion in
Korea. Actually, the Korean economy has been composed of
some limited large family-run corporations, so called "Chaebols,"
which have operated in every industry, from the agriculture to
media corporations. For instance, four big Chaebols have taken
over forty-seven percent of the total sales and more than half of
exports. In the past, Chaebols had contributed to the
outstanding economic growth of Korea. It is true that the
Korean government and Chaebols have been in companionship
for a long time with respect to rapid economic development.
However, since the philosophy of Chaebols has been to create
wealth for their family, and they do not want to lose their vested
rights in the Korean market, this side effect of the Korean
economy had been occurred as the feature of economic crisis in
late 1997.
Since the economic crisis, the government has tried to make
the Korean capital market fit with the standard of the
international capital market. In the beginning of 1998, the
government amended the foreign stock exchange regulations,
and released a new policy for free foreign exchange and foreign
investment such as relaxation of the limitations on foreign
ownership of equity. As a result of a series of opening the
financial market to foreign countries abolishing or amending
some restrictions on foreign investments and introducing new
securities market systems, foreign investors are treated
similarly, as domestic residents
under the certain
circumstances. Thus, it is expected that changes in the Korean
securities market will contribute to improving the Korean
economy with the government's endeavor to keep up with the
40.

See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.
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world securities market's internationalization. Furthermore, as
information that is more detailed becomes available to public
investors, efficiency of accessing information in the securities
market will be enhanced. On the contrary, it is also expected
that the domestic investors face with a flood of opportunities to
invest in foreign securities, thus, the government also needs to
enhance vehicles for an investor protection from "not-knowing
foreign companies" as well.
However, in spite of the some amendments, the tender offer
regulation under the KSEA is still very complicated, especially
the provisions related to the applicable securities and to the
calculation and the disclosure requirement provisions. In order
to enhance the role of the tender offer, to protect the investors'
benefits, and to create a free market order against a high
corporate competition under the new trend, the tender offer
regulation under the KSEA should be amended.
In order to prevent an abuse of the tender offer, such as
acquiring a controlling power through a sudden tender offer, the
KSEA provides the clear meaning of the tender offer. However,
as for the scope of the tender offeror, the meaning of "specially
related persons" is not clear. Thus, these pieces of legislation
about the scope of the tender offeror indirectly cause confusion
to the tender offer mechanism in securities transactions in
Korea. Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that the scope
of the "specially related persons" should be abolished, and the
meaning of the "persons acting in concert" should be concretely
described as it is in the United States.
The scope of applicable securities of the tender offer
includes the potential securities, such as stock certificates, a
certificate representing preemptive rights, convertible bonds,
and certificates of exchangeable bonds. Since these securities do
not have voting rights at the moment of the tender offer, but
they will acquire voting rights sometime in the future, adding
these potential securities to the scope of applicable securities
might impose a heavy burden on the tender offeror. In addition,
the complicated scope of the securities severely complicates
calculations of the possessed securities rate. As a result,
potential securities, such as a certificate representing
preemptive rights, convertible bonds, certificates of bonds with
warrant, and certificates of exchangeable bonds, should be
excluded from the scope of the applicable securities.
In case of a hostile tender offer, the target company's
opinion, whether it is approval, dissent, or neutrality, is very
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important to investors for making investment decisions.
Especially, the presentation of a dissenting opinion about the
tender offer can be very effective action for a target company's
defense. Therefore, the KSEA provides the target company's
right to present its opinion. Namely, the target company is not
duty-bound to disclose information, but has the right to present
an opinion about the tender offer. 41 Thus, this right to present
its opinion on the tender offer may depend on the director's
discretion.
Since there is no provision about the target company's duty
to disclose the information, it is needed to apply with the
director's duty to the company under the KCA, 42 which needs to
be enhanced to cover the target company's duty to disclose the
information. Yet, the better way is to impose the target
company's duty to disclose information on the KSEA for the
investor's protection. Thus, it is desirable that the presentation
of opinion should be a duty, not a right, in order to protect
investors. In addition, due to the importance of the presentation
of the target company's opinion, the contents of the opinion are
also very important to investors. Therefore, the contents of the
opinion should be concrete and detailed. Yet, the KSEA provides
that "the important matters shall not be omitted, and the
contents shall be such that no misunderstanding may be caused
therefrom," 43 which can be interpreted many different ways
from different perspectives. In conclusion, the KSEA should
provide the target company's duty to disclose information, and
prescribe the scope of information in detail as well.
The restricted period on exercising voting rights extends
from the date on which the stocks concerned are purchased to
six months after disposal of the stocks. 44 According to the
language of the Act, 45 when the purchaser who is ordered by the
FSC to dispose of the stocks sells the stocks to the third party,
the third party also may not exercise voting rights for six
months from the date after the purchase of the stocks. Thus, it
should be effective until the expiration of the tenth day from the
date of the filing of the statement because, from that day, the

41.
42.
43.

See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 25
See Korean Commercial Act, arts. 399(1)-(3).
See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.

44.

See Enforcement Decree of the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art.

45.

See id.

13.
12.
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tender offeror can legally purchase the securities through the
tender offer.4 6 Moreover, in order to ensure and enhance the free
securities transaction, the restriction on the voting rights of the
third party should be revised or abolished.
Since the Korean economy urgently needed foreign
currencies just after the Korean economic crisis at the end of
1997, the government intentionally forwarded the Korean
securities market to the trend of world securities market's
internationalization. As part of the government's endeavor to
open the Korean securities market to the new trend, the tender
offer system was tremendously amended to induce foreign
investment funds. However, if a domestic economy is not stable
and various related laws and regulations are not improved in
such a way to meet the realistic needs of current securities
market practices, the internationalization may cause many
problems for the domestic investor's protection. Especially, the
securities market's internationalization needs each nation's
unaffected and spontaneous participation to the new trend in
order to be globally well formed.
In case of the Korean's participation to the new trend, the
securities
market's
internationalization,
it
was
not
spontaneously initiated by the corporations, which form the
Korean economy, but was forced into existence by the
government's imminent plans. As a result, legislators of the
Korean tender offer regulation have not had enough time to
consider every legal factor and practical matters of the tender
offer in the Korean securities market. Therefore, the tender
offer regulation under the KSEA should be carefully
reconsidered to ensure the secure and fair securities
transactions in the Korean securities market, and to enhance
the role of the tender offer, protect the investors' benefits and
create a free market order against a high corporate competition
under the pressure of the trend of the world securities market's
internationalization.

46. See Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 23; Enforcement Decree of
the Korean Securities and Exchange Act, art. 11-5.

